

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 02748

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: NEXT STEPS

REF: A) STATE 166230, B) PRETORIA 3690, C) USUN 2723

1. THE CONTACT GROUP MET PM JUNE 29 TO CONSIDER
VIEWS OF CAPITALS ON NEXT STEPS. IN ACCORDANCE
WITH REF A, WE EXPRESSED DEPARTMENT'S VIEW THAT
THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE AN APPROACH TO PRESIDENT
NYERERE, MAKING CLEAR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
UNWILLINGNESS TO BUDGE ON THE LOCATION OF THE
RESIDUAL FORCE, AND URGING FRONTLINE AND SWAPO
ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS. WE
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ADDED THE DEPARTMENT'S BELIEF THAT IF NYERERE'S
RESPONSE IS NEGATIVE, AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO
URGE SWAPO'S AND THE FRONTLINE'S ACCEPTANCE OF OUR
PROPOSAL ON THE SOLE CONDITION THAT THE RESIDUAL
FORCE BE LOCATED ONLY AT GROOTFONTEIN.

2. ALL AGREED SURPRISINGLY QUICKLY THAT THE

INITIAL PRESENTATION TO NYERERE SHOULD URGE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS. UK INSTRUCTIONS WERE PARTICULARLY FIRM ON THIS LINE. THE DISCUSSION THEN SWITCHED TO THE QUESTION WHETHER, IF NYERERE IMMEDIATELY RESPONDS NEGATIVELY, THE FALL-BACK OF GROOTFONTEIN-ONLY SHOULD BE SUGGESTED IN THE COURSE OF THE SAME APPROACH. THE CANADIANS FELT STRONGLY THAT THE FIVE IN DAR ES SALAAM SHOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY, IF CONFRONTED WITH A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM NYERERE, TO SUGGEST OUR CONDITIONAL PROPOSAL. THE BRITISH, HOWEVER, OPPOSED THE IDEA. THEY HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM DAVID OWEN OPPOSING ANY SUGGESTION IN THIS APPROACH TO NYERERE OF A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE. OWEN REPORTEDLY IS CONVINCED THAT THE FIVE MUST MOVE SPEEDILY TO BRING NAMIBIA TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SPECIFICALLY WANTS THIS TO HAPPEN IN JULY, AND HE BELIEVES THAT THE PROPOSITION OF A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE WILL INVOLVE A SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF TIME. HE ALSO REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT EVEN SWAPO'S CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL IS UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE SOUTH AFRICA'S ELIMINATION OF OSHIVELLO. THE BRITISH WERE CAREFUL TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OWEN HAD NOT TOTALLY REJECTED THE POSSIBLE LATER SUGGESTION OF A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, BUT THEY BELIEVED THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TIME TO CONSIDER NYERERE'S RESPONSE TO

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OUR INITIAL PRESENTATION BEFORE
DECIDING ON HOW TO PROCEED.

3. WE JOINED THE CANADIANS IN MAINTAINING THAT THE PRESSURES OF TIME ARGUED FOR GIVING THE AMBASSADORS APPROVAL IMMEDIATELY TO RAISE THE CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE IF THE SITUATION WARRANTED IT. THIS VIEW WAS ENHANCED BY A CANADIAN REPORT THAT NYERERE WOULD BE AWAY FROM DAR ES SALAAM (BUT NOT OUT OF TANZANIA) FROM JULY 3 - 8. THEREFORE, A SECOND APPROACH TO NYERERE WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY POSTPONED UNTIL THE SECOND WEEK OF JULY (THUS PRECLUDING MUCH FURTHER PROGRESS BEFORE THE KHARTOUM SUMMIT). WE ALSO ARGUED (CITING REF B), THAT SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT ACCEPT THE ELIMINATION OF OSHIVELLO IF THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD BE THE FINAL CONCESSION THAT THEY WOULD BE ASKED TO MAKE AND THAT IT WOULD RESULT IN AGREEMENT TO A SETTLEMENT. THE CANADIANS, GERMANS, AND FRENCH ALL CONCURRED WITH US IN THIS POINT OF VIEW, AND, WHILE SHARING THE BRITISH DESIRE TO MOVE QUICKLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WE EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN OVER OWEN'S

APPARENT DESIRE TO DO SO REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE GERMANS ALSO NOTED THAT IN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S MEETING WITH KAUNDA JUNE 29 (REF C), HE MIGHT ALREADY HAVE SUGGESTED A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE. (THE GROUP HOPES TO RECEIVE WORD JUNE 30 ON THE SCHMIDT-KAUNDA MEETING AND WILL CONSIDER THEN WHAT FURTHER SHOULD BE SAID TO KAUNDA.) UK AMBASSADOR BROWN BECAME CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENTATION OF THE FOUR AND AGREED TO PRESENT

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EXDIS

THE COUNTER CASE TO LONDON.

4. THE GROUP THEN TURNED ITS ATTENTION TO THE DRAFT TALKING POINTS (REF A) FOR USE IN THE INITIAL PRESENTATION TO NYERERE. THE GROUP SETTLED ON A NUMBER OF REVISIONS (THE REVISED TALKING POINTS FOLLOW PARA 6), BUT THE PRIMARY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH AROSE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE TALKING POINTS WERE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE CANADIANS WANTED TO ALLUDE IN THE

TALKING POINTS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONDITIONAL
ACCEPTANCE. WE JOINED THE BRITISH IN ARGUING
THAT THE INITIAL PRESENTATION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO
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URGING ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS. ANY
CLEAR HINT OF A FALL-BACK SUGGESTION WOULD UNDERMINE
OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. EVENTUALLY THE GROUP AGREED
ON THE INCLUSION OF AN OBLIQUE HINT. THIS OCCURS IN
THE SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE
TALKING POINTS BELOW WHICH READS: "THEY (THE SOUTH
AFRICANS) COMMENTED THAT ONCE AGAIN THEY WERE
BEING ASKED TO MAKE A FURTHER CONCESSION, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAD ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL,
WHEREAS SWAPO HAD GIVEN NO PUBLIC INDICATION OF ANY
DISPOSITION TO DO SO".

(B) THE FRENCH TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO THE SENTENCE
IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE TALKING POINTS WHICH READS: "ANY
SIGNIFICANT BREACH OF THE TERMS OF THIS PROPOSAL BY
SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE REGARDED BY OUR GOVERNMENTS
AS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER REQUIRING PROMPT ACTION BY
THE UN AND OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE
PREPARED TO BACK STERN MEASURES SHOULD THIS HAPPEN".
THE FRENCH OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THE REFERENCE TO
STERN MEASURES AS A CLEAR CALL FOR CHAPTER
SEVEN SANCTIONS. THEY ALSO OPPOSED THE REFERENCE TO
"ACTION BY THE UN". THE BRITISH AND
CANADIANS AGREED TO SUPPORT THE ABOVE LANGUAGE ONCE
THE WORD "SIGNIFICANT" WAS INSERTED BEFORE
"BREACH". THEY BOTH STATED THAT
THEIR CAPITALS MIGHT BE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS LANGUAGE
BUT ADDED THAT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT
BREACH OF THE PROPOSAL BY SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO BE REPORTED BY THE SYG TO THE SC AND
WE UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONSIDER STERN
MEASURES. THE GERMANS SUPPORTED OUR ORIGINAL LANGUAGE,
AND THE FRENCH WERE ALONE IN THEIR CONCERN
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OVER THE REFERENCE TO "ACTION IN THE UN". THE GROUP
EVENTUALLY AGREED TO LEAVE THE LANGUAGE AS DRAFTED
(EXCEPT FOR THE INSERTION OF "SIGNIFICANT") AND
TO REFER THE MATTER TO CAPITALS.

(C) THE OTHER FOUR UNANIMOUSLY URGED DELETING

THE PARAGRAPH IN THE DEPARTMENT'S TALKINS POINTS WHICH ASSURED WESTERN AID IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA WHICH EMERGES FROM OUR PROPOSAL. THEY BELIEVED THAT SUCH AID IS ASSUMED BY AFRICANS AND THAT MENTION OF IT WOULD THEREFORE UNDERMINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OTHER ASSURANCES OFFERED IN THE TALKING POINTS. ALL FOUR FELT THAT THE OFFER OF ECONOMIC AID WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE SCRAPING THE BOTTOM IN SEARCH OF SWEETENERS. THE GERMAN REP CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING WITH A SMILE THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO OFFER WESTERN AID TO TANZANIA.

4. TWO OTHER POINTS SHOULD BE MADE ABOUT THE DRAFT TALKING POINTS BELOW: (A) THE CONTACT GROUP'S CONSIDERATION JUNE 29 OF CAPITALS' COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON WALVIS BAY IS CONTAINED SEPTTEL; AND (B) THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT IN OUR JUNE 23 MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM WE CLEARLY SUGGESTED TO WALDHEIM THE NEED FOR THE IMPACT OF THE CASSINGA RAID TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN HIS DETERMINATION OF THE SIZE OF THE UN MILITARY PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA, AND WE RECEIVED THE SYG'S CLEAR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POINT IN TERMS OF SETTING THE SIZE OF UNTAG.

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5. FOLLOWING (PARA SIX) ARE THE REVISED TALKING POINTS AGREED UPON BY THE CONTACT GROUP FOR USE WITH NYERERE. WITH THE BRITISH RESERVATIONS STATED PARA 2 ABOVE, THE GROUP AGREED TO RECOMMEND THAT, IF THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE TALKING POINTS URGING FRONTLINE AND SWAPO ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS RECEIVE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM NYERERE, THE AMBASSADORS IN DAR SHOULD SUGGEST TO NYERERE THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE. THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT NYERERE IS LIKELY TO RESPOND TO OUR INITIAL PRESENTATION NEGATIVELY, BUT ALSO BELIEVES THAT, GIVEN THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS OF GAINING SOUTH AFRICAN ELIMINATION OF OSHIVELLO, EVEN WITH A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE FROM
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SWAPO, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD FIRST BE MADE TO CONVINCE NYERERE OF THE NEED FOR ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL AS IT NOW STANDS.

6. FOLLOWING ARE THE DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR NYERERE:

BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

1. AS WE PREVIOUSLY AGREED, OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK MET WITH AMBASSADOR SALIM TO DISCUSS THE TEXT OF A POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON WALVIS BAY. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS TEXT, WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU TODAY, REPRESENTS A MAJOR STEP BY THE CONTACT GROUP TO SATISFY FRONT-LINE AND SWAPO CONCERNS AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY SWAPO'S ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSALS.

2. THUS, WE ARE LEFT WITH ONE ISSUE; THE LOCATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RESIDUAL FORCE. FOLLOWING THE FRONT-LINE SUMMIT IN LUANDA, WE ADVISED SOUTH AFRICA OF THE FRONT-LINE SUMMIT'S POSITION THAT THEIR RESIDUAL TROOP PRESENCE SHOULD BE LOCATED AT A POINT SOUTH OF WINDHOEK. AS WE TOLD YOU ON JUNE 16, THE SOUTH AFRICANS REJECTED THIS POSITION, CLAIMING THAT THEY HAD MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN AGREEING TO OUR PROPOSAL AND COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO MAKE ANY MORE.

3. FOLLOWING OUR MEETING WITH YOU ON JUNE 16,
WE RAISED THIS ISSUE ONCE MORE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN
GOVERNMENT AND PUT TO THEM THE SUGGESTION THAT THEY
SHOULD CONCENTRATE THEIR FORCE AT GROOTFONTEIN
AND RELINQUISH THE RIGHT TO STATION FORCES IN OSHIVELLO
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AS WELL. THEY REITERATED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF
OUR PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO
ACCEPT ANY CHANGE IN ITS TERMS. OUR SUGGESTION WAS
REGARDED BY THEM AS A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE
TERMS OF THE PROPOSAL. THEY COMMENTED THAT ONCE AGAIN
THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO MAKE A FURTHER CONCESSION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAD ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL,
WHEREAS SWAPO HAD GIVEN NO PUBLIC INDICATION OF ANY
DISPOSITION TO DO SO.

4. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS PROVIDES
A FAIR BASIS FOR A SPEEDY TRANSITION TO NAMIBIAN
INDEPENDENCE. SOUTH AFRICA'S RESIDUAL 1500-MAN
FORCE IN NAMIBIA, MONITORED AND CONTROLLED BY
UNITED NATIONS FORCES, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO POSE
A THREAT EITHER TO SWAPO OR TO NEIGHBORING AFRICAN
COUNTRIES.

5. IN ORDER TO REASSURE SWAPO AND THE NEIGHBORING
AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THE FIVE HAVE RAISED THIS SUBJECT
WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE
CONTEXT OF HIS PLANNING FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA, HE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NEED TO
SATISFY THE HEIGHTENED CONCERNS OF SWAPO AND THE
NEIGHBORING AFRICAN STATES REGARDING THE RESIDUAL
SOUTH AFRICAN TROOP PRESENCE IN THE WAKE OF THE
CASSINGA RAID. WE HAVE ASSURED THE SECRETARY
GENERAL THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT HIS FINDINGS AS TO THE
LEVEL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS REQUIRED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

6. IN ADDITION, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE LOGICAL SITE
FOR THE UN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN NAMIBIA
WOULD BE THE EXISTING SOUTH AFRICAN BASE AT GROOTFONTEIN.

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THE PRESENCE OF THE UN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AT
GROOTFONTEIN WOULD PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL CONTROL OVER
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES LOCATED THERE.

7. AS WE HAVE NOTED IN THE PAST, WE CONSIDER THE
FAIR AND COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR PROPOSAL IS
ESSENTIAL IN ENSURING A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO
INDEPENDENCE BY NAMIBIA. ANY SIGNIFICANT BREACH OF
THE TERMS OF THIS PROPOSAL BY SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE
REGARDED BY OUR GOVERNMENTS AS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER
REQUIRING PROMPT ACTION (BY THE UNITED NATIONS) (AND
OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO BACK STERN
MEASURES SHOULD THIS HAPPEN). AT THE SAME TIME, WE
WOULD STRESS THAT, FOLLOWING THE ACCEPTANCE OF OUR
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PROPOSAL, WE WOULD EXPECT EQUALLY SCRUPULOUS OBSERVANCE
OF ITS TERMS BY SWAPO.

8. WE ARE AT A CRITICAL POINT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS
ON NAMIBIA. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN SWAPO'S
ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL, WE HAVE EVERY REASON
TO BELIEVE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL PROCEED WITH AN
INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL FOLLOW THE WESTERN
PROPOSAL IN MANY IMPORTANT RESPECTS. UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN OUR

COUNTRIES WILL TEND TO REGARD SOUTH AFRICA AS HAVING
MADE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH AN INTERNATIONALLY-ACCEPTABLE
AGREEMENT ON NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND WILL NOT SUPPORT
ANY ACTIONS BY OUR GOVERNMENTS AIMED AT
PRESSURING SOUTH AFRICA TO ABANDON ITS COURSE OF ACTION.

9. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE
HOPE THAT YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THE SINGLE ISSUE
OF THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE MUST NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PREVENT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF EARLY
INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA. WE THEREFORE URGE THAT YOU
AND YOUR FRONT-LINE COLLEAGUES CONSIDER VERY SERIOUSLY
PROCEEDING NOW TO A SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OUR
PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS. LEONARD

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